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Spillover is a concept coined by neo-functionalism in the 1960s in order to 
account for the process of European integration. It refers to the inner 
dynamics whereby the members of a regional scheme would be compelled 
to either enlarging the scope or increasing the level of their mutual 
commitments or both. However, Latin American integration processes have 
questioned the meaningfulness and applicability of the concept, both in its 
political and technical dimensions. Through a comparison between the 
European Union, the Andean Community and Mercosur, this paper looks 
into the reasons why this happened, addressing conceptual as well as 
empirical matters. 
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Spillover é um conceito cunhado na década de 1960 pela teoria neo-
funcionalista para explicar o processo de integração europeia. Refere-se à 
dinâmica pela qual os membros de um bloco regional são incentivados à 
alargar o alcance ou incrementar o nível dos seus compromissos mútuos, ou 
ambas as coisas. Todavia, os processos de integração na América Latina 
questionam o sentido e aplicabilidade do conceito, quer nas suas dimensões 
políticas quer nas suas dimensões técnicas. Por meio de uma comparação 
entre a União Europeia, a Comunidade Andina e o Mercosul, este artigo 
avalia as razões de tal limitação, abordando questões conceptuais e 
empíricas. 
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In the last half century, European integration has been problematic but 
successful. Along the same period, Latin American integration has also been 
problematic –yet quite less successful. What accounts for such a different outcome and 
what are the lessons to be drawn regarding the divergent performance of these 
integration processes? This article addresses regional integration on both shores of the 
Atlantic so as to highlight the contrasting mechanics underlying each continental 
experience. 
 The article proceeds through three steps. First, it revisits the main contemporary 
theories of regional integration looking for their eventual application to contexts other 
than Europe. In so doing, it focuses on both institutional design and spillover effects. 
Second, it screens up three regional blocs in order to point out differences and 
similarities concerning their integrative development: the European Union, the Andean 
Community and Mercosur. Third, it compares the performance of the three regions as a 
function of both their external thrusts and their inner dynamics, and concludes by 
advancing a hypothesis that should also be tested in other regional contexts. 
Institutional design and spillover effects 
Classic theories of integration  
 Altiero Spinelli (see Mutimer 1994), David Mitrany (1943) and Karl Deutsch 
(1957) advanced the first classic theories of integration. Spinelli advocated federalism, 
Mitrany functionalism and Deutsch communicative interactionism. The former –federal 
integration— was supposed to start up from a constitutional assembly, whereas the latter 
–interactionist integration— was thought to rest on natural processes of communication 
and exchange between national societies. Functional integration would feature mixed 
characteristics: as in federalism, the beginning would be allegedly voluntary, as 
technical bodies should be created in order to carry out technical tasks. However, the 
subsequent steps would develop rather automatically –as in communicative 
interactionism—, stemming from the increasing necessity of technical management and 
the entailed learning processes. 
As Nelsen and Stubb (1994: 99) put it, functionalism “failed as a theory for 
several reasons, but one stands out: it contained no theory of politics”. When economic 
problems proved to be unmanageable by technical experts and the theory could not 
explain why certain choices had been made, a new approach was required to understand 
the development of the European Community by re-addressing the deficiencies of 
functionalism. It was in this context that a group of scholars from the University of 
Berkeley, led by Ernst Haas, developed the neo-functionalist theory. 
 Haas carried out much of his work in the 1950s and 1960s, when he supported 
the idea that technological and scientific changes would produce incentives and 
pressures for international institutional innovation. In turn, innovation would lead to 
                                                 
1 The first version of this paper was presented at the XXIII Latin American Studies Association Congress 
(LASA2001), Washington D.C., September 6-8, 2001, in a session sponsored by the Europe and Latin 
America Section (ELAS). I am grateful to Stefano Bartolini, Alberto Cimadamore and Philippe Schmitter 
for comments; however, they have no responsibility for the errors that remain. 
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political learning by political leaders, national bureaucracies and international 
organizations. In sum, the neo-functionalist, just like the functionalist and other pluralist 
approaches, argued that “what matters most is a utilitarian calculus on the part of actors, 
and not a dramatic or passionate commitment to a new order” (Haas 1975: 12). The 
theory conceived of integration as an open process, characterized by the spillover from 
one area to another. Although the ending point was supposed to be open, it was “clearly 
intended to be institutional” (Mutimer 1994: 31). 
Spillover, the central metaphor of neo-functionalist theory, is the process 
whereby “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the 
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further 
condition and a need for more, and so forth” (Lindberg 1963: 9). However, one major 
shortcoming of neo-functionalism was that it “always had more to say about the ongoing 
role of institutions than about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes” 
(Hurrell 1995a: 60). Although it recognized the difference between background 
conditions, conditions at the time of union, and process conditions –thus allowing for 
different variables to have a different weight according to the stage—, the main accent 
and stronger predictions were oriented towards the process. Once integration had 
started, neo-functionalism saw it being fostered by two sorts of spillover: functional and 
political –unlike Mitrany’s purely technical conception. This two-fold mechanism 
predicted that integration would become self-sustaining. Such expected capacity of 
prediction was what neo-functionalist authors believed to be one the most salient 
features of their theory. 
Schmitter (1969) conceived of spillover as a member of a more numerous 
family. According to the two defining variables, scope (coverage of issue areas) and 
level (decisional capacity) of authority, spillover meant the simultaneous increment in 
both indicators. In contrast, the simultaneous decline was called spillback. Retrench 
meant greater decisional authority along with less coverage of issue areas, whereas 
muddle about named the opposite case. Two extra possibilities were also anticipated: 
spillaround, that defined an increase in the coverage of issue areas with no change in the 
level of authority, and buildup, which implied greater levels of authority irrespective of 
any increment regarding its scope. In this view, both spillover and buildup were oriented 
toward the construction of a political community. 
Over time, however, spillover did not take place as expected. What first 
appeared as a complex and mechanical process changed afterwards into an extremely 
contingent phenomenon, of little use for understanding general events. As a 
consequence, Haas began to stress the role of ideas and “consensual knowledge”, thus 
paying increasing attention to the relevance of political leaders and their goals (Waltz 
1991). 
 The change of focus, from an automatic and incremental evolution of 
international complexity toward a less-determined process, led to the modification of 
some previous assumptions. Henceforth, the role that individuals could play in the 
international arena –when located in crucial institutional positions— needs to be 
highlighted as a key element of broader developments. De Gaulle’s outstanding 
appearance was decisive for Haas’s theoretical reformulation (Haas 1975). From then 
on, the challenge would be to endogenize the possibility of such an occurrence into the 
theoretical models of integration. 
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Contemporary theories of integration 
The decline of neo-functionalism, induced by the eurosclerosis of the 1960s and 
1970s and the crisis of the Central American Common Market –where it had been 
promisingly applied (Schmitter 1970)—, would give way to a new debate in the 
succeeding decades. As from the early 90s, there would be two main theories of regional 
integration: liberal intergovernmentalism –or intergovernmental bargaining theory, as 
depicted by Moravcsik (1998)—, and the latest development of neo-functionalism, 
usually termed supranational institutionalism or supranational bargaining theory –albeit 
formally called a transaction-based theory of integration by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
(1998). Both will be briefly revised next. 
Moravcsik presents a three-stage approach to regional building with a particular 
focus on the European Union. In the first stage, national preferences are defined by each 
state based on its economic interests; therefore, the theory dismisses the view that 
geopolitical interests may hold the same importance as economic ones to explain the 
formation of national preferences. The second step consists of negotiations between 
national governments to fulfill their nationally defined preferences; these negotiations 
depend on the asymmetrical interdependence existing between the bargaining states and 
not on any kind of supranational entrepreneurship. The last phase involves the 
establishment of common institutions; Moravcsik sustains that the choice to transfer 
sovereignty to international institutions is neither due to federalist ideology nor to 
centralized technocratic management, but to the will to ensure credibility for the 
achieved commitments. A subsequent option, that between pooling or delegating 
decision-making competencies, varies across countries and issues and responds to the 
equilibrium reached among national preferences in each bargain. 
 Supranational institutionalism is also crafted to explain the rise and shape of the 
European Union, although its usage of general theories to account for integration allows 
for generalization and application elsewhere. The fundamentals of supranational 
institutionalism draw on two of the previously mentioned classic theories, i.e. 
communicative interactionism and, especially, neo-functionalism. It assumes that the 
increase of transnational transactions between neighboring countries leads to the 
development of a more complex pattern of relations, both social and economic, within 
and among countries. The resulting increase in complexity cannot be managed 
satisfactorily by existing norms and regulations, as the costs of information and 
transaction are expected to rise. It is the need to reduce these costs what drive 
transnational transactors to claim for the establishment and standardization of regional 
rules. 
 Just like liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational institutionalism conceives 
of national states as paramount actors of integration. But, unlike the former, it sees other 
actors –namely transnational transactors, the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice— as similarly powerful (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). Therefore, 
all the four national, transnational and supranational actors must be reckoned to play a 
part in determining the outcome of the European Union. Although the theory 
acknowledges that the integration process was set off by national decisions, it underlines 
that it was the Treaties of Paris and Rome themselves that established the first 
supranational bodies in 1951 and 1957. Supranational institutions were present since the 
very beginning of European integration. 
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 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 6) make explicit the theoretical roots of 
supranational institutionalism, as they observe that “the three constituent elements of 
our theory are prefigured in neo-functionalism: the development of transnational 
society, the role of supranational organizations with meaningful autonomous capacity to 
pursue integrative agendas, and the focus on European rule-making to resolve 
international policy externalities”. They also claim to agree with Haas “that there is a 
logic of institutionalization” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 16). It is precisely at the 
institutional level that they advance significant modifications to the previous 
theorization. 
 While recognizing that the institutional structure is likely to generate feedback 
effects, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 19) highlights two underlying dynamics that 
keep the integration process far from any mechanical or political automatism: one has to 
do with path-dependence, the other with principal-agent relations. Path-dependence 
means that the performance of institutions depends on historical developments as much 
as on purposeful design, thus paving the way for unanticipated effects; in turn, principal-
agent relations express the possibility that institutional actors develop a considerable 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their principals. Therefore, supranational institutionalism 
departs from neo-functionalism and, especially, from intergovernmentalism, as the 
aforementioned dynamics reinforce their argument that “institutionalization in the EC is 
not reducible to the preferences of, or bargaining among, member governments. The 
expansion of transnational society pushes for supranational governance,2 which is 
exercised to facilitate and regulate that society” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 19). 
Table 1 displays a stylized comparison of all mentioned theories. 
 Another crucial aspect of integration is its possibility of developing in either a 
negative or positive way (Caporaso 1998). Negative integration refers to the dismantling 
of national restraints on trade and distortion of competition, while positive integration 
implies common policies that shape the conditions under which markets operate 
(Scharpf 1996). This distinction is highly significant because the former may be attained 
through intergovernmental proceedings, while the latter would require to be enforced by 
supranational organizations and rules. Since negative and positive integration are 
generally sequential, the use of this criterion supports the view of those who see the 
passage from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism as progressive over time; 
however, progressive does not mean irreversible. 
 All in all, complex spillover is nowadays understood as a function of various 
factors: the expansion of transnational society, the institutional structure of both the 
regional bloc and its member states, path-dependence, and supranational bargaining. 
The next section focuses on three regional blocs, aiming to measure the weight of each 





                                                 
2 Supranational governance is defined by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) as the competence of the 
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Spillover at work? The European Union, the Andean Pact, and Mercosur 
The European Union 
According to some authors, integration is deemed to failure –or will simply not 
take place— if it is not based on previous economic cooperation (Tamames 1994) or 
interdependence (Moravcsik 1998). This is considered the reason why pre-war attempts 
at European integration failed to succeed, as they were oriented toward ambitious 
political goals but fell short of achieving a preceding level of economic integration. 
However, once adequate levels economic interdependence and cooperation have been 
met, some kind of institutional arrangement is needed to overcome emerging problems 
of coordination, externalities, and collective action (Wallace 1999). The Treaties of 
Rome and the earlier one of Paris, among other more encompassing agreements such as 
NATO, initially provided such arrangement to Western Europe. 
Most theories of regional integration reckon two conditions, economic 
cooperation and (at least a minimum set of) common institutions, as necessary for the 
integration to proceed. Concerning the relation between regional and common 
institutions, however, Claude has pointed out that “the… achievements of the (EU) are 
attributable less to the formal capacity of its institutions to function without the 
cooperation of governments than to their success in stimulating that cooperation” 
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(Claude 1971: 111-112). Regional institutions have been, in this light, a “facilitating 
condition” for states to perform integration, not a reason per se. 
From its very beginning, European integration was not only institutional but also 
supranational. The High Council –later Commission— and the Court of Justice were 
created in 1951, with binding powers over the member countries. A joint parliamentary 
commission was also established; it became a directly elected supranational parliament 
in 1979. In contrast, the Council of Ministers and, since 1974, the European Council 
were kept intergovernmental. The supremacy and direct effect of community law were 
built upon this mixed institutional structure, although such an end was not prefigured in 
the start. To the contrary, it was the operation of the European institutions what brought 
about institutional change and normative evolution. 
A new dilemma arises when it comes to appraise the role played in integration 
processes by the national states. It concerns the inner division of functions and latent 
interests of office holders, especially regarding the leading agency in foreign affairs –the 
executive branch. In the EU, “state executives play a major role…, and much lobbying 
is channeled through them, but the Commission and the European Parliament (and on 
occasion the European Court of Justice) are also worthy targets for subnational 
governments” (Marks et al 1996: 45). This acknowledgment elicits a further question: 
what would happen in a region that lack common institutions such as the Commission 
or the Parliament? Would state executives concentrate upon themselves all the 
subnational and social pressures? In that case, through what channels could spillover 
effects manifest themselves? 
 Since “executive control over foreign policy depends to a large degree on the 
nature of the political institutions and domestic structures” (Risse-Kappen 1996: 57), the 
case of France acquires a particular exemplarity in the European context. Although the 
French regime is now considered as little different from classic parliamentarism,3 in the 
beginning the 5th Republic was closer to a presidentialist design. From such institutional 
platform De Gaulle advocated an intergovernmental Europe. In 1962 he regretted the 
“statelessness” approach of the EC, and in 1963 rejected the first application of Britain 
(Nicoll and Salmon 1990: 80/1). It is a telling event that it was the head of the only 
“presidential” government of Europe who once jeopardized the integration process –
even willing, Thatcher could never produce a similar impact. This fact highlights the 
wide room for maneuver that presidents, as heads of government, may hold with regard 
to integration (Malamud 2003). 
 While some authors have stated that ‘Europeanization’ implies power transfer 
from national states to the (albeit fuzzy) European level of governance (Wallace 1999), 
others claim that it may well strengthen national states (Milward 1992). Most, however, 
agree that it has tended to remove domestic issues from domestic controversy and into 
the arena of executive control (Risse-Kappen 1996; Moravcsik 1998). The convenience 
of formally acknowledging the authority of national executives over the integration 
process led to the belated creation of the European Council –the European executive 
summit—, which was established in 1974, twenty years after the EC was founded. The 
temporal progression displayed by the EU would be turned around in South America, as 
will be dealt with below, where national executives commanded the process from the 
very beginning. 
                                                 
3 I thank Jean Blondel for having called my attention to this point. 
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 In what follows, I will pinpoint some paradoxes that characterize the EU, in the 
expectation that they may shed some further light on other cases of integration. The first 
paradox has been outlined by Wallace, who emphasizes how “governance is becoming 
increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while representation, 
loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation 
state” (1999: 521). A second paradox has been observed by Streeck and Schmitter 
(1991); they were puzzled by the development of a pluralist organization of interests in 
a regional arena whose member states mostly featured corporatist forms of 
intermediation. A third paradox is likely to emerge from a growing unrest concerning 
the way of election of the Commission and the tenure of the President of the Council. 
Authoritative scholars such as Hix (1997), a number of statesmen –among whom 
Giuliano Amato and Felipe Gónzalez—, and the European constitutional convention 
headed by Valery Giscard D’Estaing have advanced proposals advocating whether 
direct, popular election of the president of the Commission or a longer term for the 
president of the Council –what would entail the making of a presidential European 
system out of (almost) all parliamentary European states. The Americanization of 
European politics would reach its peak if a fourth paradox comes true: the consolidation 
of a European party system following either an American or a Canadian scenario, as 
suggested by Katz (1999). He argues that the superior level of party interaction need not 
be dominant, and that cartellization may well be a response to a federal-like European 
constitution. 
 While the forces that set off European integration have been allocated either to 
an external threat (the USSR) or an internal hazard (Germany); to an external push (the 
USA) or an internal pull (reconstruction), the thrust for its evolution can be partially 
allocated to some kind of positive feedback –or complex spillover—, what led to 
unexpected outcomes. The EU has never had a defection or a hegemon –despite some 
arguments to the contrary as in Mattli (1999). Its success is due both to its institutional 
strength and to the firm commitment of its members (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991). 
Complex spillover has actually taken place in Europe, along with a kind of politicization 
–one of the spillover side-processes— that has not hindered the development of 
technical management. This has not been the case in other regional contexts. 
The Andean Community 
 The Andean Pact (or Andean Group), predecessor of the Andean Community 
(CAN), was established in 1969 within the framework of LAFTA (Latin American Free 
Trade Association). Together with CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), it made part 
of the second wave of integration processes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its 
goals were to improve the conditions for participation of the less developed countries 
encompassed by the LAFTA agreements, while simultaneously aiming at the gradual 
formation of a Latin American Common Market. Five countries signed its founding 
treaty, the Cartagena Agreement: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. 
Venezuela joined the group in 1973, but Chile withdrew in 1976. The Andean Group 
constituted an agreement stemming from, and depending on, the Treaty of Montevideo, 
and would not acquire juridical autonomy until 1983, when the Tratado de Creación del 
Tribunal de Justicia del Acuerdo de Cartagena entered into force. In the 1990s, after a 
period of stagnation and crisis, the integration process was relaunched and its 
institutional structure was strengthened. 
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 The emergence of the Andean Pact was a direct response to LAFTA’s 
deficiencies, and its integration scheme was more far-reaching than anything ever before 
accomplished in this field in the Third World (Mace 1988). Two main features 
characterized it. At the economic level, it relied on two parallel processes: intra-regional 
trade liberalization and regional industrial planning. At the political level, it created a 
decision-making structure that comprised two main institutions, the Commission and 
the Junta, whose respective majority-rule voting and binding supranational authority 
were as ambitious as exceptional.4 An additional element was an extensive program of 
special treatment for the less developed countries in the group (i.e., Bolivia and 
Ecuador). 
 The process of Andean integration had started in 1966 when two democratic 
presidents, those from Chile and Colombia, invited their counterparts to examine 
alternative courses of action to LAFTA. The subsequent instability of democracy in 
most partner countries would become a major liability of the process, whose origin and 
development were boldly marked by the character of the domestic political regimes. As 
a matter of fact, all founding members except Colombia were undergoing democratic 
breakdowns around 1970. 
 Although the Andean Pact performed quite satisfactorily in its early years, the 
enlargement to Venezuela and the withdrawal of Chile generated a succession of major 
crises. Given the complexity of the Andean integration scheme, those events led to the 
renegotiation of some important mechanisms of the process and, in the end, to the 
complete abandonment of the original integration schedule (Mace 1988). Apart from the 
rigidity of the Agreement, the failure was given many other reasons: (a) unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits, (b) politicization of integration issues, (c) 
incompatibility of national policies, (d) non-compliance of the member countries with 
the Andean Decisions (Vargas-Hidalgo 1979), (e) great political instability, and (f) lack 
of regional leadership (Mattli 1999). While causes (c –incompatibility) and (e –
instability) were basically domestic, the others were intrinsic to the integration process. 
Among them, two variables were related to power issues – (a -distribution) and (f -
leadership)— and two to institutional issues –(b -politicization) and (d -non-
compliance). One of the recipes proposed to overcome the crisis was to build regional 
institutions able to settle conflicts between members, and so was done. The result was 
the creation of the Court of Justice and the Andean Parliament in 1979.5 However, these 
institutions lacked real weight –due to, in neofunctionalist terms, the precedence of form 
over function. The integration process would not recover momentum until 1987, when 
the Quito Protocol was signed in order to flexibilize its working mechanisms. 
 The renewed institutional structure of the Andean Pact was broader and deeper 
than any other region’s in Latin America –as it had also been since its very origins. 
Nevertheless, it was not until all presidents met in 1989 that the region firmly embarked 
on a process of deepening and opening; the setting of the Andean Presidential Council 
                                                 
4 Within the intergovernmental Commission, responsible for all the major decisions concerning the 
integration process, no member country was allowed to unilaterally veto community decisions except on 
very important subjects. In turn the Junta, endowed with administrative, agenda-setting, and decision-
implementation functions, enjoyed supranational powers that entitled it to make resolutions binding on all 
member countries –at least formally (Mace 1988). 
5 The Court entered into activity in 1983; the Parliament is still comprised of representatives of the 
national congresses, but plans are laid for them to be directly elected shortly. 
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in 1990 was to consolidate such a bid. The Presidential Council is comprised by the 
presidents of the member countries and constitutes the highest-level body of the Andean 
Integration System (AIS). In turn, the AIS is the series of bodies and institutions that, 
working in coordination, directs the process of integration and governs over its 
operation (as shown in Table 2). 
Table 2 
Andean Integration System 
Ruling Bodies Community Institutions 
• Andean Presidential Council (intergovernmental) • Andean Business Advisory Council 
• Andean Council of Foreign Ministers (intergov.) • Andean Labor Advisory Council 
• Commission of the Andean Community (supranat.) • Andean Development Corporation (CAF) 
• General Secretariat (supranational) • Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) 
• Andean Parliament (supranational) • Simón Bolívar Andean University 
• Court of Justice (supranational) • Social Conventions 
 
In 1997, the Junta became the General Secretariat of the Andean Community, 
the executive body of the renamed bloc, while the Commission kept its role as central 
rule-maker. Today, the legal principle of direct effect and the preeminence of the 
community law turn the Andean Community into the second region in the world 
according to the level of formal institutionalization, only behind the European Union. Its 
economic record, however, is far less impressive. Although a free trade zone is in force 
since 1993 –first between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, with Peru being 
incorporated later— and a common external tariff is operative since 1995, not economic 
development but social turmoil, political instability and economic failure have been the 
mark of the region. Furthermore, a brief war between Ecuador and Peru was waged in 
1995 on the ground of territorial disputes. The balance of the process is rather 
ambiguous: despite the highly institutionalized organization and the commitment to 
establish a common market by 2005 at the latest, the Andean countries have not yet 
succeeded in creating a region of peace, stability and development. As a result, some of 
them have opted for negotiating complementary agreements with third countries or 
regions (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela with Mexico, and Bolivia with Mercosur). 
 The stages of the Andean integration process can be summarized as follows: a 
first, brief period of progress from 1969 to 1973; a long period of stagnation and crisis 
between 1973 and 1987/89; and the relaunching of the process since then. Yet the last 
two stages were not homogeneous: while the apparent failure of the earlier covered a 
wide process of formal institution-building, the apparent success of the later disguised a 
serious crisis between 1991 and 1994, a series of democratic comedowns, and even a 
war between two member states. 
Some authors have controversially suggested that certain regions (e.g., 
Mercosur) have developed an institutional mimetism with the European Union 
(Medeiros 2000). To be sure, institutional mimetism was in the minds of the Andean 
Pact founders, but its outcome has been far distant from the European Union’s. No 
spillover effects have taken place, and only joint national intervention could put back on 
track the integration process. Even so, both analysts and protagonists consider that the 
results have been unsatisfactory. 
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Mercosur 
 As already said, most of the approaches to regional integration recognize a 
central position to economic –and social— aspects such as commercial flows and trade 
interdependence. The so-called convergence theories –stressing the convergence 
towards more liberal, deregulated, open, and market-oriented policies on the part of 
previous divergent national economies— acquire great importance in explaining the 
push for integration in many sub-versions of diverse theories. 
Paradoxically, Mercosur challenges the above assumption. As Hurrell points out, 
“it is worth stressing that liberal theories (both neo-functionalist and [liberal 
intergovernmentalist]) which see co-operation as a response to the problems generated 
by increased interdependence have little to say about the moves towards subregional co-
operation that gathered pace in the second half of the 1980s. Indeed state-led co-
operation was a response to declining levels of trade interdependence” (Hurrell 1995b: 
258). Neither liberal intergovernmentalism nor supranational institutionalism could 
explain the initiation of integration in Mercosur; still, the question might be posed as 
whether they can shed some light over its further steps. 
 Mercosur was formally founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, but its origin dates back to 1985. This year, Argentina and Brazil started a 
rapprochement after decades of distrust,6 and later this bilateral axis became the core of 
the regional process. Currently, Mercosur constitutes the most advanced project after the 
EU, as far as the level of integration –not the degree of formal institutionalization— is 
concerned: it has reached the stage of a customs union (albeit incomplete). However, its 
institutional development has not followed the European path: no supranational body 
has been set up, no community law has been created, and no fixed dispute-resolution 
court had been established until 2004 (Hirst 1995; Peña 1998). The institutional 
structure of Mercosur is completely intergovernmental, and all its rules need to be 
internalized through domestic procedures to enter into force. Nonetheless, a pure 
intergovernmentalist approach to this intergovernmental region would not be 
meaningful, since no major interstate bargaining (e.g. the Treaty of Asuncion of 1991 
and the Ouro Preto Protocol of 1994) has led to either institutional pooling or delegation 
–the expected outcomes of the theory. Mercosur is still completing its negative stage of 
integration, while negotiations to advance through the positive phase have been 
repeatedly relaunched and subsequently forgotten. 
A further complication for the advance of Mercosur is located at the subnational 
level of its largest member states. In the EU, federalism and regionalism are said to have 
given rise to multilevel governance; this is so because some regions skip the national 
level to deal directly with the European political center –i.e. Brussels. But what would 
the impact of federalism upon integration be if no such center exists? In Mercosur, the 
Argentine provinces and the Brazilian states are only able to impinge upon national 
decision-makers in order to exert any influence over the integration process. The link 
between presidentialism and federalism, in the absence of any regional bodies, may so 
acquire an increasing relevance in shaping the integration profile. 
A key distinction between the contending theories of integration is that that 
discerns between politicized and technical-economic processes. Politicization refers, 
                                                 
6 Although the two countries had already started a confidence-building process in 1979, under military 
rule, it was only after the democratization took off that cooperation gained momentum (Lafer 1997). 
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according to Schmitter (1969: 166), “to a process whereby the controversiality of joint 
decision-making goes up”. Nevertheless, he underlines that “most investigated cases 
have involved expansion into ‘technical’ areas”, since “spillover can... occur without 
politicization”. While it is true that the neo-functionalists have been the main supporters 
of this distinction, intergovernmentalism also seems to accept the dyad simply to turn it 
upside-down, emphasizing the major importance of asymmetrical power over technical 
management. In contrast, the dynamics of Mercosur may be rather understood as 
running along a different continuum: from the politicization pole on one side to the 
institutionalization pole on the other (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Different uses of the concept “politicization” 
Theory Context Conceptual continuum and emphasis 
Neo-functionalism European Union Politicization Technical management 
Intergovernmentalism European Union Politicization Technical management 
Inter-presidentialism Mercosur Politicization Institutionalization 
 
Assuming the first mentioned use of politicization –as opposed to technical 
management—, Caporaso (1998: 347) argues that “power has been strangely 
downplayed in the EC. I can see two reasons for backgrounding power. The first reason 
is that integration studies, as a field, have a ‘technicist’ orientation in a certain sense… 
The second…has to do with the nature of the EC itself”. But what does he mean by 
nature? The mechanism through which political leaders agree on general principles and 
leave the drafting of the detailed rules to leading national and supranational technicians 
is previous to the development of any EU nature. In fact, it was the process –lately 
known as the ‘Messina method’—used in the drafting of the Treaties of Rome (Haas 
1967: 340). In contrast, the operation of Mercosur –so-called interpresidentialism 
(Malamud 2003)— fits better the second meaning of politicization as opposed to 
institutionalized proceedings. Mercosur presents a process of non-conflictive 
complementarity between politicians and técnicos, albeit featuring a sharp supremacy of 
the former, without supplying a solid institutional framework. Whether this is due to 
Mercosur’s nature or to its immaturity –hence temporary— is still to be seen. Only 
further events will tell if there is movement along the continuum, what the sequences 
are, and what kind of feedback eventually turns out –if any. 
Spillover dynamics: when and why 
Until a few years ago, a major difficulty in studying integration was “the single-
case issue” provided by the European experience (Caporaso 1998). Now that integration 
seems to have settled roots elsewhere, comparative studies have become possible. 
However, while most theorists concerned with integration are now switching from 
international relations to a comparative politics approach, they are still conceiving the 
EU as a novel, rather particular case instead of approaching it by contrast to other 
regions (Hix 1994; Schmitter 1996; Caporaso 1998). This may be fruitful for a better 
understanding of the EU domestic politics or the Europeanization of the national 
polities, but does not allow for a comparative understanding of integration processes as 
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such. Likewise, the contributions made in the field of public policy (Heritier 1996) and 
regulation theory (Majone 1993) are not yet generalizable to other regions. 
What are the perspectives for the theoretical debate on integration? It is likely 
that it will widen up over the next few years, along with the expansion of the subject 
matter itself. The consolidation of regions other than Europe, whether following the 
European model or not, will demand further research to cope with. However blurred 
such development may appear at present, some of the major debates it is likely to raise 
are foreseeable: a) the prior relevance of micro or macrofoundations; b) the relationship 
between transnational society and supranational institutions; c) the relevance of history 
and path-dependence (Caporaso 1998); d) the scope, limits, and shape of regional 
institutionalization; and e) the role, extension and type of democracy –at both the 
national and regional levels (Schmitter 1996; Bartolini 1998). 
 The issue of institutionalization (points b and d, but also c) is certainly not 
missing in the debates on European integration. The role played by the Court of Justice 
has been recognized as crucial to foster integration, especially during the seeming 
stagnation ages of the 1970s and early 1980s (Weiler 1994; Stone Sweet and Brunell 
1998). Moreover, some authors have arrived to the point of explicitly proposing “an 
institutionalist theory of European integration” (Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998) –albeit still 
shortly developed and empirically feeble. The difference between the EU and Mercosur, 
however, is that what must be explained in the European Union is the presence (and 
shape) of institutions, whereas in Mercosur the question to be accounted for is their 
absence. 
 Whereas the theories exposed in Table 1 have been devised to deal with the EU 
evolvement, and hence have become part of the decision-makers’ background in a 
feedback process, this has not yet occurred in Mercosur. Neither federalism nor neo-
functionalist spillover was in the minds of Mercosur founders, nor have they made their 
way into the main treaties. Rather, it seems that the eventual analyses and decisions 
profited from the failure of past Latin American experiences –among which the Andean 
Pact was paramount—, which were seen as excessively ambitious in terms of 
institutions, and naïve regarding the faith on supranationality. The dichotomy, in the 
political debate, opposed supranationalism to intergovernmentalism; and the former was 
clearly defeated by the latter. Yet, current institutional choice need not necessarily be 
forever: as Sbragia (1992: 16) puts it, “the logic of regulation and political conflict in a 
common market with a single currency is very different from that found in a customs 
union”. Therefore, if Mercosur is to be turned into what its name portrays, it will have to 
modify its institutional structure. 
Before the 1990s, all attempts at integration in Latin America failed due to 
different factors. The most significant were (a) the low level of prior interdependence, 
(b) the scarce convergence regarding levels of development and economic policies, (c) 
the political instability brought about by the frequent breakdowns of democracy, and (d) 
the adoption of either too weak or too rigid regional institutions. The Andean Pact 
suffered from all four drawbacks, whereas Mercosur only suffered from the two former 
ones. However, it was able to overcome them –at least in part— via the stability of 
democracy and the prudence in choosing an adequate and flexible institutional structure. 
The point in case is that the latter two were somehow connected, since a specific type of 
political regime –presidential democracy— articulated with a loose regional 
institutionalization to bolster the process. The price to pay was the absence of sufficient 
 15 
conditions to produce feedback or spillover, so progress in integration remained 
conditional to unanimity and national political will. 
Table 3 
Historical factors for integration failure in South America 
  Character 
  Political Economic 




Inadequate institutionalization Low interdependence 
 
Table 3 classifies the four factors of failure above cited according to two criteria: 
character (either political or economic) and scope (either domestic or regional). It is 
visible how recent progress in Latin American regionalism was due to political factors, 
not to economic ones. This return of politics should not be a surprise. Haas (1967: 338-
9) had already called attention to the fact that, given that political parties and 
parliaments were not regarded as “sufficiently central to the political process in some 
Latin American countries to serve the function their counterparts played in Europe”, 
technocrats were frequently encouraged to take their place as brokers within the 
integration process. Henceforth, it was the failure of Latin American técnicos to 
accomplish such a role what led to the stagnation or reversal of most integrative 
endeavors until the late 1980s, when leading politicians decided to take the task on 
them. 
The historical mismatching between economic interests and political 
arrangements has frequently been noted, especially along the last two decades. Grugel 
and Almeida Medeiros (1999: 56) argue that “integration in LAC failed in the past 
because of a lack of real economic interests between LAC firms, despite the complex de 
jure structures of integration that were created.” Likewise, Mattli (1999) focuses on 
demand and supply of integration as sine-qua-non conditions for success, the latter 
being a political response that is triggered by the former. 
Table 4 























1947 1951 1957 and 1985 1957 - 1979 1951 1974 
Andean 
Community 
1966 1969 1996 1987 1983 1989 
Mercosur 
 
1985 1991 -- -- -- 1991 
 
The 90s meant a watershed in what South American integration regards. The 
birth of Mercosur in the first place, but also the relaunching of the Andean regional 
 16 
efforts, might be signing a new beginning –although it is early to say. Many were the 
factors that brought about such a revival; crucial among them were the restoration (or 
inauguration) of democracy all across the region, the resolution of border and military 
conflicts, and the homogenizing constraints that the national economies ought to face in 
the wake of global processes. And still, economic interdependence was absent from the 
picture. As illustrated above, what accounted for the relative success of the new 
attempts was a political variable, not an economic one. The institutional novelty fueling 
the regional renaissance was the direct involvement of the national executives. In short, 
integration in South America is developing as a supply-side phenomenon (Perales 
2003). Table 4 displays the key dates of the three regional processes analyzed above, 
showing how the creation or momentous transformations took place in South America 
only after the intervention of national executives, while in Europe the process 
unwrapped with greater autonomy from national governments. 
Table 5 
Comparative regional features 
 Supranational institutions Spillover 
European Union YES YES 
Andean Community YES NO 
Mercosur NO NO 
 
I would like to wind up by advancing a last conclusion: as suggested by Table 5, 
I claim that the existence of supranational institutions is likely to be a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for spillover to proceed. As three cases do not constitute a 
statistically significant sample to test the argument, further research is needed to check 
whether the insights proposed here can be generalized to other regional blocs across 
space and time. 
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